# Open TSA — Server

**Free, open-source RFC 3161 timestamp infrastructure for Europe.**

Open TSA provides a free public RFC 3161 timestamp service that any developer, researcher, NGO, or startup can build on without cost or lock-in. The dominant alternatives are either expensive commercial TSAs (€200–1,000+ per year) or unreliable single-operator free services with no source code. This project closes that gap with production-grade open infrastructure.

- **Live service:** https://tsr.open-tsa.eu
- **Project home:** https://open-tsa.eu
- **License:** MIT
- **Server location:** Nuremberg, Germany (Hetzner)

---

## Quick verification

Verify that the live service works correctly, from any machine with `openssl` and `curl`:

```bash
# 1. Download CA certificates (one-time)
curl -s https://open-tsa.eu/certs/ca.crt -o ca.crt
curl -s https://open-tsa.eu/certs/fullchain.pem -o fullchain.pem

# 2. Create a test document and request a timestamp
echo "Hello, Open TSA" > test.txt
openssl ts -query -data test.txt -cert -sha256 -no_nonce -out test.tsq
curl -s -H "Content-Type: application/timestamp-query" \
     --data-binary @test.tsq \
     https://tsr.open-tsa.eu -o test.tsr

# 3. Verify
openssl ts -verify -in test.tsr -queryfile test.tsq \
           -CAfile ca.crt -untrusted fullchain.pem
# Expected output: Verification: OK
```

If you see `Verification: OK`, the service is functioning correctly.

---

## Run your own instance

You can run an independent Open TSA instance. The setup is reproducible on any standard Linux server with Node.js and OpenSSL 3.x.

### Requirements

- Linux server (tested on AlmaLinux 9, Debian 12, Ubuntu 22.04 LTS)
- Node.js 18 or newer
- OpenSSL 3.x (`openssl version` should print `OpenSSL 3.x`)
- A domain name pointing to the server (for TLS via Let's Encrypt)
- Port 443 reachable from the internet
- Approximately 5 GB of disk space

### Build and deploy

```bash
# 1. Clone
git clone https://git.open-tsa.eu/open-tsa/server.git
cd server

# 2. Install dependencies
npm install

# 3. Generate the 4-tier CA hierarchy
#    Root CA (25y, offline) → TSA Root CA (15y, offline)
#    → Intermediate CA (10y) → TSA Signing Cert (2y)
sudo ./setup-ca.sh

# 4. Copy and adjust environment configuration
cp .env.example .env
nano .env
#    → set TSA_HOST, TSA_PORT, CA_DIR, TSA_POLICY_OID, etc.

# 5. Start the service
node service.js
```

### Reverse proxy

The service listens on `127.0.0.1:3700` by default. Expose it via nginx with Let's Encrypt:

```nginx
server {
    listen 443 ssl http2;
    server_name tsr.example.org;

    ssl_certificate     /etc/letsencrypt/live/tsr.example.org/fullchain.pem;
    ssl_certificate_key /etc/letsencrypt/live/tsr.example.org/privkey.pem;

    # Block internal endpoints from public access
    location /admin/  { return 404; }
    location /metrics { return 404; }

    location / {
        proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:3700;
        proxy_set_header Host              $host;
        proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For   $remote_addr;
        proxy_set_header X-Real-IP         $remote_addr;
        client_max_body_size 64K;
    }
}
```

`X-Forwarded-For` must be set to the real client IP — the service uses it for rate-limit accounting and statistics. Without it, the rate limiter sees only `127.0.0.1` and treats all traffic as one client.

### Health check

```bash
curl http://127.0.0.1:3700/health
# {"status":"ok","service":"open-tsa","version":"1.0.0","openssl":"OpenSSL 3.x.x ...","time":"...","total_timestamps":N}
```

---

## Architecture

```
Internet
   │
   ▼  HTTPS (port 443)
nginx — TLS termination, Let's Encrypt
   │
   ▼  HTTP (port 3700, localhost only)
service.js — Node.js / Express
   │
   ▼
openssl ts -reply — RFC 3161 token generation
```

The service is intentionally minimal. The cryptographic heavy lifting is done by `openssl ts -reply`. The Node.js layer handles HTTP, request validation, rate limiting, audit logging, and metrics.

### Certificate hierarchy

```
Root CA                    (25 years, offline)
└── TSA Root CA            (15 years, offline)
    └── TSA Intermediate   (10 years)
        └── TSA Signing    (2 years)
            EKU: id-kp-timeStamping (critical)
```

Root and intermediate private keys are kept offline. Only the TSA signing key is online.

---

## Configuration

See `.env.example` for all available options. The most important ones:

| Variable | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|
| `TSA_HOST` | Interface to bind to | `127.0.0.1` |
| `TSA_PORT` | HTTP port to bind | `3700` |
| `CA_DIR` | Path to CA hierarchy | `/opt/open-tsa/ca` |
| `TSA_POLICY_OID` | Your own policy OID (allocate at https://pen.iana.org/) | placeholder |
| `RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` | Per-IP rate limit (0 = disabled) | `60` |
| `AUDIT_LOG` | Append-only JSONL log path | empty (disabled) |
| `METRICS_ENABLED` | Prometheus `/metrics` (loopback-only) | `true` |
| `LOG_LEVEL` | `error`, `warn`, `info`, `debug` | `info` |

---

## Operating notes

### OpenSSL 3.x quirks

Open TSA targets OpenSSL 3.x explicitly. A few things to know:

- `ess_cert_id_chain = no` is **required** in `openssl-tsa.cnf` — there is a known bug with the `-chain` flag in OpenSSL 3.x.
- `default_policy` must be a numeric OID (text policies crash `openssl ts`).
- `other_policies` must not be set to an empty value.
- The `serial` file must contain an **even number of hex digits** (e.g. `1000`, not `10000`). OpenSSL 3.x rejects odd-length serials with `a2i_ASN1_INTEGER:odd number of chars`.

### Serial number permissions

The CA setup runs as `root`, but the service runs as a less-privileged user. The setup script sets the necessary permissions on `serial`, `index.txt`, and `newcerts/` at the TSA tier so that the service can issue tokens. The higher tiers (Root, TSA Root, Intermediate) remain root-only.

### Renewing the TSA signing certificate

The TSA Signing Cert has a 2-year lifetime. Only the signing cert needs replacement at the 2-year mark; root and intermediate certificates have much longer lifetimes (25 / 15 / 10 years respectively).

---

## Roadmap

- **Phase 1 (current):** Single-node free public TSA in Nuremberg, RFC 3161 compliant, MIT-licensed.
- **Phase 2:** Multi-region deployment (Falkenstein DE + Helsinki FI), GeoDNS failover, browser-based verification tool.
- **Phase 3:** Explore browser trust paths (HARICA collaboration, Mozilla root program submission) — non-binding research track.

---

## Contributing

Contributions are welcome. The canonical home of this code is **git.open-tsa.eu**.

**To contribute:**

1. Clone the repository (anonymous, no account needed): `git clone https://git.open-tsa.eu/open-tsa/server.git`
2. Sign up on `git.open-tsa.eu/user/sign_up` (e-mail confirmation required)
3. Fork the repository, push your branch, open a pull request against `main`
4. We review within a few days

For larger changes or feature proposals, please open an issue first to discuss the approach.

**Reporting bugs:** open an issue at https://git.open-tsa.eu/open-tsa/server/issues or send an e-mail to `info@open-tsa.eu`.

**Security issues:** please do not file public issues. Send details to `security@open-tsa.eu`.

---

## License

This project is released under the **MIT License**. See [LICENSE](LICENSE) for the full text.

---

## Acknowledgements

This project addresses a gap identified by the European open-source community: free RFC 3161 timestamp infrastructure that is independently operated, source-available, and not dependent on a single private individual or commercial entity.

Funded development supported by the **NLnet Foundation** under the NGI Zero Commons Fund (pending review at time of initial publication).

---

## Contact

- **Web:** https://open-tsa.eu
- **E-mail:** info@open-tsa.eu
- **Source:** https://git.open-tsa.eu/open-tsa/server